Extreme Management in Disaster Recovery  by Brandon, P.S.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
The Twelfth East Asia-Pacific Conference on Structural Engineering and Construction 
Extreme Management in Disaster Recovery  
P S Brandon a*
a School of the Built Environment, University of Salford, UK 
Abstract 
Major disasters require a different form of management because of the extreme conditions under which this type of 
management intervention takes place. This applies, not only to the immediate aftermath of the disaster event, but in 
the subsequent reconstruction period following the emergency humanitarian relief. This period is sometimes 
overlooked when addressing the urgency of meeting the humanitarian needs but nevertheless can have as much 
impact on human suffering as the event itself. Often this gap between the relief and the reconstruction can last for 
years while the donations provided by both governments and relief organisations can lie idle in banks demanding to 
be spent. Partly this is caused by the systems devised by governments to disburse sums and partly by the nature of the 
problem and the limited tools available. In fact, defining the problem in a way which will allow conventional 
methods to address the problem is a major issue in itself. To aid the planners and reconstruction teams, new 
innovative methods of structuring and solving the problem need to be devised. 
This paper addresses this issue and calls on the knowledge of the author in investigating the ‘gap’ between event 
and reconstruction and his experience in reviewing the situation after the 2004 tsunami in the country of Sri Lanka. It 
suggests possible tools which can be used in a crisis situation in terms of management protocols, high level technical 
support (particularly with regard to information technology and communication) and economic vehicles which may 
release funds earlier in the process. These are still experimental but nevertheless they attempt to improve the 
performance of planning, design and construction personnel in resolving the delays in getting construction underway. 
The author also suggests that these techniques, developed and used under extreme conditions, may provide methods 
which may be adaptable to improve the performance of all such teams under normal conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
Disasters and natural calamities demand a high degree of intervention under extreme conditions.  In the 
case of natural disasters the initial effort is focussed on humanitarian relief and the support for human life. 
In time this effort is refocused on the other issues which allow a return to normality. These include the 
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civil infrastructure, the ordinances of governance, the economic activity which supports a community and 
the implementation of the legal framework which allows a civilised community to operate. With man-
made disasters then again steps have to be taken to ensure resilience against the mistake or attack or 
whatever difficulty ensues, often in a similar way to the impact of natural phenomenon. Thus mistakes, 
physical wars and more recently cyberwars (The Economist, 2010) are always a possibility somewhere in 
the world and human error can be found everywhere including within the decisions made to try and 
remedy the problem.  
The stresses in such complex situations are immense and lead to what might be called Extreme 
Management. This occurs where there is chaos in the information flows which will allow a solution to be 
sought; where the infrastructure for a remedy is badly damaged or completely destroyed; where 
communication is badly impaired or put out of action; where the knowledge for the application of 
conventional management tools is unavailable; and where the resources required to solve the problem are 
difficult to find. Such situations are often found in military conflicts and, consequently, it is military 
personnel who are often in the forefront of solving major natural disasters. Increasingly it is government 
and non-government organisations which are being asked to address the reconstruction after the event and 
they require more conventional tools and methods to solve the problem. Often it is the structuring of the 
problem which is the key in order that conventional processes can be adopted to provide the solution. 
This paper attempts to indicate where tools are available which could assist in this complex arena 
particularly in relation to management, communication and economic vehicles. 
2. Wicked problems 
The problem domain in the management of disasters is difficult to formalise except in very constrained 
circumstances. This issue was identified by Rittel and Webber (1973) when they suggested that the 
problems that planners face are inherently different from the problems that scientists and engineers deal 
with which they consider are mainly ‘tame’ i.e. they are clearly defined problems with a clear mission and 
clear indicators for when the problem has been solved. At some point there is a switch from the 
management of a chaotic situation to one where order is restored and traditional methods can be 
employed. This may be unfair, for certain types of engineering and scientific problems also require a 
different approach beyond scientific method or engineering calculus. They suggested that these type of 
problems could be labelled ‘wicked problems’ as there is no definitive problem formulation, instead ‘the 
formulation of a wicked problem’ is the problem. 
They suggest the following: 
y There are no criteria to indicate when a solution has been found and the eventual solution is decided 
through reasons external to the problem such as time or cost constraints. 
y Solutions to wicked problems are value-based, that is they are not true or false, but good or bad. 
y There is no way of testing and fully appreciating the consequences of a solution as the full scope of 
its repercussions cannot be traced. 
y There is no opportunity for trial and error; every solution has an immediate and irreversible impact 
on the system. 
y There is no fixed number or set of permissible solutions to a wicked problem, they tend to be 
unique and, therefore, there are few replicable solutions. 
y Wicked problems are nested across levels in the sense that every problem can be considered a 
symptom of a problem at a different level. 
y The usual rules of science to formulate and test a hypothesis cannot be applied and the explanation 
of a discrepancy, and hence the proposed resolution of the problem, is mainly determined by the 
‘world view’ of the analyst. 
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y Unlike a scientist whose hypothesis can often be refuted without major consequence, the planners 
cannot afford to be wrong as the solutions to his or her problem have direct and irreversible impacts. 
To this could be added in the case of reconstruction after a disaster that there are serious time pressures 
where failure might result in serious consequences to human life. 
This list of criteria for a ‘wicked problem’ is clearly applicable to natural disasters (and, to some extent, 
man-made disasters as well). Imagine an extensive flood, large earthquake or tsunami. In the beginning 
there is chaos. It is not possible to ascertain the extent of the problem; the boundaries to land and the 
ownership are vague and sometimes impossible to re-establish; governance becomes an issue because 
sometimes all administration has been demolished or swept away; the resources required to solve the 
problem conventionally (including the labour) may be severely impaired or non-existent; the people who 
have suffered may have moved on and it is not clear who is being addressed in any reinstatement of the 
physical infrastructure. The whole situation is compounded by the need to get something done in a very 
short space of time. 
This complexity and the need for speed places management in an extreme situation compared with 
normal problem-solving procedures. They face an emergency situation which is designed to get the 
essentials for human existence back on track and operational so that the rebuilding effort can commence 
in a more conventional way. It is about the resilience of the infrastructure and the speed at which 
resources can be mobilised. Recent experiences such as Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the 
recent massive floods in Pakistan demonstrate that it is extremely difficult to respond quickly even, as in 
the case of Katrina, in advanced countries where the technology and finances are available.  
However, out of these terrible situations and the severe tests that they place on conventional methods 
comes new thinking and possibly new technologies which can have a major impact not only on future 
disaster responses but on the way we approach traditional approaches to developing the built environment.  
When a major challenge is placed on a discipline usually it disrupts the conventional wisdom and leads to 
innovation within the field. For example, the desire for space travel has had a major influence on the 
miniaturisation of technology and our ability to communicate.  
Innovation needs a driver (Brandon, 2008) and this can be heard in the old saying that ‘necessity is the 
mother of invention’.
3. Addressing the gap 
The humanitarian response and the re-establishment of infrastructure are the first phase of the response 
to disaster. In some cases this phase can be over in a matter of weeks but in others it can continue for 
years. There is a ‘gap’ which exists between the event of the disaster and the conventional rebuilding 
programme which it is now realised is critical in delivering the humanitarian support which many 
agencies feel is essential and responds to the motivations of their donors. 
It was with these issues in mind that the RICS (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors) set up a 
Presidential Commission in 2005 with the task of exploring how the built environment professions could 
support the humanitarian effort in reconstruction after a major disaster. The first commission of this panel 
(of which the author was a member) was a study of post-disaster reconstruction and the transition from 
humanitarian relief prepared by the Max Lock Centre at the University of Westminster (Lloyd-Jones, 
2006). This report defined the phases for planning before, through and after a disaster and made the case 
for addressing this gap which had been identified (Figure 1).   
Governments and other institutions have identified the delay in getting funding to projects from relief 
agencies even if the planning has been well developed. For example, after the 2004 Tsunami the 
authorities in Sri Lanka were only spending around one third of the donated monies committed in their 
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original phases of reconstruction over the first two years despite having a comprehensive plan of work 
and commitment. This is not uncommon. 
Figure 1: Where planning for medium and long term recovery can occur before and after a natural disaster (Mind the Gap! Post-
disaster reconstruction and the transition from humanitarian relief, Lloyd-Jones T, Max Lock Centre, University of Westminster,
2006) 
Some of this delay is related to the complexity on the ground and some is due to weak management and 
government policy. However, there is another problem related to the sheer number of organisations 
involved. Figure 2 shows the institutional complexity in just the United Nations disaster response 
organisation and it can be seen that coordination of so many agencies is a major problem. If all the other 
government and non-government agencies involved are included which support these groups then the 
difficulties are multiplied substantially. At each interface between these organisations there has to be a 
management input and the overhead becomes enormous. There is a clear need to simplify the problem 
and have working models to which all participants can support and adhere. 
4. The interface problem 
The interface predicament is very real in all infrastructure and building problems (Brandon, 2009). As
the building and construction process has been made more complex then the number of specialisms has 
increased and the interfaces between them have resulted in a substantial increase in management input to 
solve the problem.  This results not only in an increase in management cost but also an increase in overall 
time which in turn can lead to further cost. In the case of disasters both these factors have severe 
repercussions on achieving the management objectives. In some cases it can result in a severe reduction in 
the ability to rebuild.  
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Besides rationalising the number of agencies involved, new tools are required to enable the 
management teams involved to respond quickly to the situation presented.  Inevitably these tools will 
need to harness the power of the new technologies and particularly the information technologies to aid the 
process. The rest of this paper will attempt to address some of these key issues and provide examples of 
the tools and technologies which can help. 
5. Process protocol 
If we are to understand the nature of the processes that have to be managed when a disaster occurs then 
there must be a reference point which would allow the manager to check whether he has all the 
information he needs and to call and plan for information which he will need in the future to continue the 
management process. In the case of a major disaster this can be extremely complex and fraught with 
problems which are why the situation often looks chaotic even after the humanitarian support has come 
and gone. Ownership, legal, boundary, access issues etc, still exist and it is critical that team dealing with 
the reconstruction know what they need to know, what they have in their possession and where they 
intend to go with the management process. 
The solution appears to be a map or protocol which defines these issues in such a way that the ‘jigsaw 
puzzle’ of information can be built up in a structured way to allow conventional methods to eventually be 
applied in an effective and efficient way. The team at Salford University has been working on such 
protocols for some years and has been applying them to major construction sites which are complex in 
nature.  In 2006 they, in conjunction with the RICS and a number of practitioners experienced in disaster 
management, developed a process protocol for disaster situations which has now been published as a 
manual and supporting CD for those who would wish to use it (Fleming et al., 2009).  
The need for such an approach has been identified many times. For example this statement: 
It is crucial that all stakeholders buy into common standards, approaches and methodologies. All 
recovery processes would greatly benefit from having a single information structure that can collect, 
analyse, and disseminate information and that would have buy in from local stakeholders, including 
Government, IFI’s, NGO’s, donors and UN Agencies (Clinton, 2006). 
Figure 3 provides a high level ‘map’ of the process which identifies the activities which need to be 
undertaken. This is a generic protocol applicable to most disaster situations. It is then possible to drill 
down through each generic activity to more specific actions needed to address the type of disaster which 
is being faced. The needs of a flood will be different to those of an earthquake which will be different 
again to those of a major fire or tsunami.  
With maps such as these it is possible to plot what information has been received and what is needed. 
The Process Protocol also identifies the major stages for reconsidering what actions should be taken, i.e. 
the soft and hard gates.  Soft gates are where a major review should take place but the process can 
continue while more information becomes available while hard gates are where activity should not be 
continued unless all the previous processes have been completed. In time it should be possible to link 
various management models and resource planning modules to each activity as it emerges. The protocol 
provides a foundation upon which all other actions can be based and to which all monitoring processes 
can be referred. 
To support this framework it is absolutely essential to have information technology support to make 
sense of what is happening on the ground in a quick and efficient way. The earlier Process Protocols were 
supported by information technology in the sense that they recorded what needed to happen but they were 
not developed into a full operations style information and knowledge handling system. New technologies 
now provide new opportunities. 
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Figure 2: Institutional complexity in the UN disaster response set up. (Mind the Gap! Post-disaster reconstruction and the transition







cedia Engineering 14 (2011) 84–94Figure 3: Generic Disaster Management and Reconstruction: Process Protocol (Fleming et al., 2009)  
P.S. Brandon / Procedia Engineering 14 (2011) 84–94 91
6. Communication
One of the key problems in managing a major disaster is the whole area of communication. It may be 
possible to know what information is required to manage, it may be possible to know what actions are 
needed to be taken but unless the two way flow of information between the management team at the 
centre and on the ground is efficient and effective then there will be the potential for severe breakdowns 
resulting in delays, increased costs and misuse of resources. In the worst case it can result in making the 
disaster even worse. In addition, the new information technologies can be used to aid the rebuilding 
programme through improved knowledge transfer. 
Already the new technologies are being used to provide support to the whole area of management 
support. Increasingly the situation is moving from straightforward communication and data exchange to 
one of knowledge management. Data collection is developing quickly and technologies such as LIDAR 
(Light Detection and Ranging) and GPS which help provide a quick visual assessment of the disaster 
scene coupled with advanced mapping techniques are enabling delivery teams to be much more quickly 
aware of what the problem is, where the boundaries are and what action is possible for developing 
infrastructure transport and other means (See the MapAction  website, 2010, 
http://www.mapaction.org/about.html). 
Technology has been recognised as an important contributor in resolving a potential disaster in the oil 
industry particularly with off-shore installations where the physical environment does not enable 
conventional methods of analysis communication and development of infrastructure. The uses include 3D 
geo-modelling, seismic interpretation, 3D imaging of the terrain, interactive modelling with real time 
performance, simulation, augmented reality and many other different applications which can be used in 
the exploration phase and in the case of an emergency situation such as the failure of an oil rig or even a 
major oil spill (Russo et al., 2006). 
The potential for further development is enormous with increased mobility of the technology through 
satellite and GPS and the use of high speed communication networks which allow augmented reality, real 
time communication through tele-immersive systems and high speed simulation of events. The Thinklab 
at Salford University has been experimenting with many of these technologies for several years (See 3D 
mapping and knowledge base technology, Figure 4). These management tools are beginning to change the 
way in which managers are viewing the response to the disaster situation both literally and metaphorically.  
They are changing both assessment and response and they are also enhancing the effectiveness and 
efficiency in the rebuilding process.  However, there is some way to go before the more advanced forms 
can be used in countries where the communication infrastructure is weak or where the financial resources 
are not available. Unfortunately, many of the world’s worst disasters are in poorer countries and there is a 
danger that these countries will suffer more even though mobile technologies are improving rapidly. 
7. Economic management  
One of the major problems faced in the period of recovery after a disaster event is the rapid change in 
the supply and demand of resources. The normal situation for demand is disrupted to such an extent that 
often the local economy cannot cope with the consequences of a major rebuild of infrastructure and 
buildings in, what is usually, a very short space of time. Often it is not possible to instantly provide the 
labour, plant and material as well as organisational resources required to respond to the demand from the 
local or regional markets. The consequence of this rapid increase in demand and limited supply is an 
increase in price as explained by conventional economic models. Since the supply now has to extend 
beyond the local, regional or even country boundaries it is much more difficult to exercise any price 
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control on the resources required and therefore inflation ensues. This then eats into the donor funds and 
reduces the amount of rebuild which can be undertaken. 
The following table provides an example following the Sri Lankan Tsunami in 2004. 
Figure 4: Applying advanced modelling techniques for mapping and knowledge, University of Salford ThinkLab, 2010 
Table 1: Construction cost estimates over time for a housing unit supplied by charitable donors (Source: Institute of Policy Studies, 
2006)
Donor 
Unit area (ft2) 
Initial Estimate March 
2005(US$) 




Red Cross 600 6250 10,000 12,500-13,000 
CARE International 550 4500 5500-6500 7000-8000 
Aitken Spence Co Ltd 550 4500 >5000 5500 
World Vision Lanka 500 5500 7000 7500-8000 
Caritas Sri Lanka 500 5000 6500 8000 
Sarvodaya Movement 500 5000 6500 6000-7000 
Forut Institute 550 5000 5500 8000 
In a period of less than 2 years the estimate for the cost of building a new house had risen by at least a 
third. In addition to the capacity constraints of the construction industry which resulted in the change in 
estimated costs, the Sri Lankan government insisted that donors should select only contractors who had 
registered with the Institute for Construction Training and Development (ICTAD). This made matters 
worse as by that time, some donors had already started reconstruction with local contractors. Work on 
these sites was stalled until this rule was withdrawn. This rule did not affect owner-driven as opposed to 
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donor-driven programmes as mass scale contractor-led construction was not envisaged in it (Karunasena 
and Raufdeen, 2010). 
Although it was recognised that quality was an issue, hence the requirement for ICTAD registered 
contractors, this additional constraint made the capacity for a quick response even smaller. In addition, 
the extreme situation made the potential for corruption more likely. These same issues are found in most 
parts of the world where governments cannot control the market. This presents an enormous challenge to 
any redevelopment of this kind and requires new models of capacity building and economic evaluation 
which can be exercised within this extreme situation. 
There are no simple solutions and governments throughout the world are experimenting with new 
vehicles for funding reconstruction operations. In Sri Lanka the authorities tried two parallel approaches 
for housing namely donor-driven (where the donors of funds in conjunction with government undertook 
the development, usually on a larger scale) and owner-driven (where money was supplied in stage 
payments to the owner of the property to rebuild his or her property). There were advantages and 
disadvantages in both approaches but neither solved the problem of the need for a quick response to the 
human need. Millions of dollars of donated money was left in bank vaults while the procedures for 
reconstruction attempted to disburse the funds on a fair and equitable basis. 
The financial vehicles and economic models to resolve these problems require much further work if the 
response to disaster events is to be effective and efficient. 
8. Summary 
This paper has sought to demonstrate the nature of the ‘wicked problem’ faced by all those who seek to 
redevelop infrastructure and construction in the wake of a major disaster and in the transition from 
humanitarian relief. Defining the problem is a key element in the whole reconstruction process. It requires 
tools which will enable the professional team ( Lloyd-Jones (Ed) 2006) to address the difficult 
circumstances faced by those engaged with this extreme form of management. 
There is a ‘gap’ which exists between the phasing out of humanitarian aid and the reconstruction 
process and sometimes this gap can be as critical as the results of the event itself. Donor aid for these 
major disasters is often not distributed to those who need it until several years after the event has occurred 
and meanwhile those involved continue to suffer. 
To assist in this process new tools and new technologies are required which can speed up the solutions 
and the quality of the management process. These tools honed under extreme conditions might well 
demonstrate that they have applicability in more conventional situations as positive spin-offs from the 
awfulness of the disaster itself. It would appear that with global warming there will be even more extreme 
situations in the future and a global response is required. There is an argument for an international 
network of all those engaged in research and innovation into post-disaster reconstruction to share 
knowledge and build the models required. Addressing these extreme problems has the potential to focus 
on the key elements of management planning and simulation which will be of benefit to a much wider 
community of design and construction personnel. 
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